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1 Introduction 
It is well established that wording must be interpreted in the light of their context 
being "the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose and, within limits, 
its background…" [one] must have regard to the context in which the words of the 
section occur even though… the words themselves appear to be clear and 
unambiguous… the emerging trend in statutory construction is to have regard to 
the context in which the words occur even where the words to be construed are 
clear and unambiguous. This "technique" is now required by the Constitution, in 
particular by section 39(2).1 
It appears customary in secondary sources to initiate any discussion on section 417 
of the Companies Act 61 of 19732 with the word "draconian".3 Consulting a dictionary 
one is informed that "draconian" relates to, or is characteristic of, Draco or the 
severe code of laws held to have been framed by him.4 Draco was an Athenian law 
scribe under whom small offences had heavy punishments, and thus the perception 
appears to be that the provisions of section 417 are overly harsh and that the 
potential scope of the provision is disproportionate to the rationale for which it was 
enacted. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that section 417, although 
                                        
  Yvette Joubert. BA LLB (Wits) LLM (UJ). Lecturer in Private Law, University of Johannesburg. 
Email: yjoubert@uj.ac.za. This is a reworked article based on the LLM study of Y Joubert entitled 
"Section 417 of the Companies Act 1973" (LLM -dissertation UJ 2012). 
  Juanitta Calitz. LLB LLM LLD (UP). Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University 
of Johannesburg. E-mail: jcalitz@uj.ac.za. 
1  Satchwell J in Huang v Bester 2012 5 SA 551 (GSJ) para 17. Hereafter referred to as "Huang v 
Bester". 
2  Hereafter refer to as the "Companies Act". 
3  See Botha v Strydom 1992 2 SA 155 (N) 159G-I; Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth 
1995 2 SA 433 (SE) A-B. 
4  Merriam Webster Date Unknown Draconian http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
draconian. 
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wide in ambit,5 does not offend our sense of justice and fairness, and that it 
therefore deserves to remain part of the future South African insolvency law regime.6 
This article deals with the question of whether or not section 417 is adequately 
framed in order to fulfill its intended purposes in South African insolvency law. As 
stated in the quotation above, the current trend is to interpret legislation with 
reference to its context, ie the scope and purpose of such legislation, and thus the 
study is aimed at a policy evaluation. The intention is to determine whether section 
417 conforms to the underlying values and interests that it was designed to serve 
and whether the outcome is advantageous to society.  
The reason for focusing on section 417 is based on the unique and inquisitorial 
nature of the section, which jars with our sense of justice and seems a curious 
inclusion in a predominantly adversarial system. A section which allows for a witness 
to be summoned ex parte, where such person has no access to the application and 
cannot compel the discovery of documents, nor has access to the enquiry itself or 
the record of it, does indeed seem draconian in our modern age of constitutionalism 
and in the face of modern legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000.7  
Although the scrutiny of private examinations is not novel, it is felt that further 
exploration of the subject is justified by virtue of the fact that robust and innovative 
legislative changes have been seen in the South African corporate landscape. The 
section has already been tested and found to be lawful and constitutional,8 but the 
                                        
5  Reference is made to the word "any" five times in s 236(1). In Huang v Bester para 17 Satchwell 
J points out that the word "any" in s 236 "offers the most open-ended and far-reaching 
enumeration…which it is possible to describe". 
6  In the early nineties the South African Law Reform Commission embarked on an extensive study 
of South African insolvency law and published its Report on the Review of the Law of Insolvency 
in 2000: see SALC Review of the Law of Insolvency vols 1 and 2. For a more detailed discussion 
see Evans Critical Analysis of Problem Areas 430; Burdette Framework for Corporate Insolvency 
Law Reform ch 3; Boraine and van der Linde 1998 TSAR 621; Havenga 2001 SA Merc LJ 408; 
Loubser 2007 SA Merc LJ 123. 
7  Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 8.5.2 notes that a witness is entitled to a copy of the record of 
his own evidence at his own cost. 
8  Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 8.5.2, where it is noted that save for part of s 417(2)(b), all 
provisions of s 417 and 418 are not constitutionally invalid. See further Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 
SA 751 (CC), hereafter referred to as "Bernstein" or "Bernstein v Bester". The provision of s 
417(2)(b) that "any answer given to any such question may thereafter be used in evidence 
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aim is to ascertain whether the section serves a legitimate purpose and is necessary 
in a democratic society. A further impetus to this study was the judgment of Kebble 
v Gainsford,9 which again brought section 417 to the fore and thus prompted a more 
in-depth investigation of the nature, scope and objectives of the section. The court 
concluded in Kebble that the circumstances of that matter clearly indicated the need 
for private investigation by the liquidators and the judgment is therefore a positive 
affirmation for the continued demand for investigations of this nature. The Kebble 
judgment is not critically analysed, as such an analysis would not aid a deeper 
understanding of section 417, but the approach taken by the court in the matter in 
lucidly setting out the nature, scope and purpose of the section is utilized as a 
springboard for this investigation. In short, the question asked in this article is 
whether or not section 417 is adequately framed in its current format in order to 
fulfill its intended purpose in South African insolvency law. 
In Part 2 the law applicable to South African private examinations is considered. The 
primary source is section 417 of the Companies Act. Secondary sources include 
academic texts and judicial interpretation, in particular the matter of Kebble v 
Gainsford.10 Part 3 comprises a comparative study, albeit very brief and condensed, 
taking a look at a similar provision in the Insolvency Act of the United Kingdom, 
namely section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986.11 England is chosen as a source of 
comparison because much South African insolvency law emanates from England.12 
Further, the decision was prompted by the Kebble judgment itself, which refers to 
English cases that are seminal in this area of the law. Part 4 provides a comparison 
between the two systems for the purpose of identifying areas where South African 
                                                                                                                          
against him" is constitutionally invalid with effect from 27 April 1994, in relation only to criminal 
proceedings other than those mentioned in the text, see Ferreira v Levin 1996 1 SA 984 (CC), 
hereafter referred to as "Ferreira v Levin". 
9  Kebble v Gainsford 2010 1 SA 561 (GSJ). Hereafter referred to as "Kebble" or "Kebble v 
Gainsford". 
10  Kebble v Gainsford. 
11  Hereafter referred to as "Insolvency Act, 1986". 
12  Our earlier insolvency legislation also had much in common with the English bankruptcy law. 
Ordinance 64 of 1829 was introduced in the Cape of Good Hope and although the basis of the 
Ordinance was English law, it wove together English and Dutch practice and established the 
principles of our present insolvency practice. See Burdette Framework for Corporate Insolvency 
Law Reform Part 2 77. 
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law may benefit from reform, and concludes with suggestions for appropriate 
reform. 
2 South African law 
2.1 Introduction 
The matter of Kebble v Gainsford is a useful vehicle for looking at the nature and 
purpose of a section 417 examination as the judgment contains extensive and 
constructive references to the various objectives of such an examination.13 In his 
judgment Levenberg AJ relied heavily on the approach of the constitutional court in 
the matter of Bernstein v Bester,14 where the constitutionality of section 417 and 418 
was tested. Levenberg AJ finds himself in good company in his reliance on the 
Bernstein case, as this case has been embraced as a seminal decision on particularly 
the right to privacy, and in the approximately six years since the judgment it has 
been referred to in almost ninety High Court and Constitutional Court cases.15 For 
the purposes of this article, the comments relating to sections 417 and 418 are of 
relevance. The court in Bernstein declared sections 417 and 418 to be 
constitutionally valid. The comments of Ackerman J relating to the objectives of a 
section 417 examination are of particular interest and these comments will therefore 
be used as a point of reference. To begin with, however, the facts of the Kebble 
matter are provided below. 
2.2 The facts 
The facts of the Kebble case are evident from the judgment and can be summarised 
as follows: The applicant, Kebble was faced with a summons compelling him to 
testify in a section 417 examination. He did not wish to be submitted to such an 
examination and brought an application for the proceedings to be set aside. Kebble 
was the sole surviving director of a company called BNC ("the company") prior to its 
liquidation. He openly admitted in an affidavit that the company had been used as a 
                                        
13  Kebble v Gainsford. 
14  See n 8 above. 
15  Lawcite Date Unknown http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=1996+ZACC+2. 
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vehicle to perpetrate a fraud against another company, Randgold.16 Randgold 
launched successful winding-up proceedings against the company and subsequent to 
the final liquidation order, a settlement agreement was entered into whereby Kebble 
agreed to pay Randgold an amount of R30 million in settlement of any claims 
against him.17 Kebble also alleged that Randgold undertook not to support the 
private examination at which he was summoned to give evidence. Kebble 
commenced payment in terms of the settlement agreement, but soon stopped due 
to an alleged dispute. This necessitated a second settlement agreement. The 
liquidators declined to be party to either of the settlement agreements due to the 
inherent risk they would be exposed to.18 They were of the view that as no payment 
was made to the company itself, it was not to the benefit of all creditors. Although 
Randgold was the only creditor to come forward at that stage, other creditors had 
been identified. Randgold was not prepared to indemnify the liquidators against 
possible claims by other creditors. Kebble alleged that the proposed examination 
was an abuse for two reasons: the only proved creditor, Randgold, did not want the 
examination to continue as its claim had been satisfied by the settlement 
agreements and the liquidators were already possessed of sufficient information to 
effect the winding-up of the company, as well as to pursue litigation if necessary. 
The liquidators disputed these allegations.19  
2.3  The judgment 
Kebble's main contention of abuse was found to be unsubstantiated. He contended 
that the continuance of the examination would invalidate the settlement he had 
reached with Randgold, but the court found that had he wanted to rely on his 
bargain with Randgold he should have included the liquidators as parties to the 
agreement.20 With regard to his second main contention, namely that the liquidators 
already had sufficient information to proceed with litigation, the court pointed out 
that even if the liquidators had a subjective intention to sue, based on the decision 
                                        
16  Kebble v Gainsford 565D. 
17  Kebble v Gainsford 564B. 
18  Kebble v Gainsford 567E. 
19  Kebble v Gainsford 571J. 
20  Kebble v Gainsford 576A. 
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in Cloverbay Ltd (Joint Administrators) v Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
SA,21 that would not preclude them from going ahead with the examination.22  
The court held that it was not incumbent upon the liquidators to demonstrate a need 
for the examination. It was the obligation of the party wishing to stop the 
examination to demonstrate a "clear abuse".23 This Kebble had failed to do. On the 
contrary, this was clearly a case where an examination was warranted. The court 
listed nine reasons in support of this contention: 1) Kebble was the only surviving 
director of the company. 2) The only reason the company was formed was for 
fraudulent purposes. 3) The company was hopelessly insolvent and the liquidators 
had a duty to enquire as to the causes of the company's failure. 4) The fraud that 
had been committed was of a complex nature requiring further examination. 5) The 
fact that Kebble was prepared to pay R30 million to bring the examination to an end 
showed that he was not a person without knowledge of the affairs of the company. 
6) It was against public policy to permit an examinee to avoid a liquidator's 
examination through a settlement to which the liquidators were not a party. 7) 
Kebble himself had conceded that there may be other legitimate claims against the 
company and the liquidators should be given the opportunity to investigate such 
claims. 8) As long as there were outstanding claims against the company, the 
liquidators had a duty to pursue all potential assets. 9). The fact that the liquidators 
had carried out their own examinations and prepared the groundwork for the 
examination should not be used against them. If this were not so, liquidators would 
be prevented from ever preparing for enquiries, lest their diligence count against 
them.24  
The court pointed out, further, that it was the duty of the court to protect examinees 
at an examination. If questions were asked that were abusive, the Commissioner, as 
an officer of the court, should disallow them. If the Commissioner's discretion was ex 
  
                                        
21  Cloverbay Ltd (Joint Administrators) v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 1991 Ch 90 
(hereafter referred to as "Cloverbay"). 
22  Kebble v Gainsford 575G. 
23  Kebble v Gainsford 579A. 
24  Kebble v Gainsford 577C- 578F. 
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2.4  The duties of a liquidator  
As stated above, Levenberg AJ quoted extensively from the Bernstein matter, where 
Ackerman J summarised the major statutory duties of a liquidator in a winding-up. 
Ackerman J's summary is not provided, as it is in substance premised on the duties 
set out in the Companies Act, as discussed below. 
The duties of a liquidator are found in sections 391 to 410 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973. The relevant sections are mandatory, thus in each case the liquidator 
"shall" perform the duty stipulated. The act first stipulates general duties and then 
lists specific duties. The general duties of the liquidator are noted to be the 
following: to proceed without delay to recover and take possession of all the assets 
and property of the company, to apply such assets and property in satisfaction of 
the costs of the winding-up and the claims of creditors, and to distribute the balance 
among those who are entitled thereto.25 The specific duties of the liquidator include 
the duty to give information to the Master of the High Court,26 to facilitate the 
Master's inspection of the books and documents of the company, and generally to 
aid the Master in the performance of his duties under the Act.27 A liquidator further 
has a duty to expose offences and act thereon. He must examine the affairs and 
transactions of the company before its winding-up in order to ascertain if any of the 
directors and officers or past directors and officers of the company have 
contravened any provision of the Act or committed any offence.28 Where 
appropriate, the liquidator must report any grounds to disqualify a director.29 Before 
submitting his final account, the liquidator has to submit a report to the Master 
containing full particulars of any contraventions or offences. The Master in turn has 
a duty to transmit a copy of this report to the Attorney-General. The liquidator has a 
duty, except in the case of a member's voluntary winding-up, to present a report to 
                                        
25  Companies Act s 391. 
26  Hereafter referred to as the "Master" or "Master's office". The Master of the High Court is a 
public servant who is charged, inter alia, with control over the administration of insolvent 
estates. S 1 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 defines "Master" in relation to any 
matter, property or estate, as the Master, Deputy Master or Assistant Master of the High Court 
who has jurisdiction in respect of the matter, property or estate. 
27  Companies Act s 392. 
28  Companies Act s 400(1)(a). 
29  Companies Act s 400(1)(b). 
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the creditors and contributories. This report has to be submitted no later than three 
months after the date of the liquidator's appointment to a general meeting of 
creditors and contributories of the company and has to set out, inter alia, the capital 
issued by the company, its estimated assets and liabilities, the causes of the failure 
of the company (if it had failed) and the progress and prospects of the winding-up.30 
Of significance is the fact that the liquidator has to note in this report whether or not 
further examination is in his opinion desirable in regard to any matter relating to the 
promotion, formation or failure of the company or the conduct of its business.31  
As stated above, the duties of a liquidator summarised by Levenberg AJ in the 
Kebble matter correspond in material respects to those set out in the Act. What 
needs to be considered next is to whom the liquidator owes such duties. 
2.5  To whom does the liquidator owe these duties? 
Although a company remains in existence during winding-up, it ceases from the 
commencement of the winding-up to carry on its business except in so far as may 
be required for the beneficial winding-up thereof, and its directors lose their powers 
except insofar as their continuance is sanctioned by the liquidator.32 Whereas the 
business and affairs of the company up to that point are managed by or under the 
direction of its board,33 who are accountable to the body of shareholders as a whole, 
the focus changes on winding-up to the benefit of creditors. It must be noted, 
however, that advantage to creditors is not one of the circumstances required for a 
company to be wound up by a Court.34 Here the Companies Act differs from the 
Insolvency Act, which requires an advantage to creditors if a natural debtor's estate 
is sequestrated.35 
                                        
30  Companies Act s 402. 
31  Companies Act s 402(1)(f). 
32  Companies Act s 353. 
33  Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 66. 
34  Companies Act s 344 (a)-(h) sets out the circumstances in which a company may be wound up 
by a court, with s 344 (f) (when the company is unable to pay its debts) and s 344 (h) (when it 
appears just and equitable that the company should be wound up) most often being referred to. 
35  Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 s6(1). See also Evans Critical Analysis of Problem Areas part IV for a 
detailed discussion. 
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It is trite South African law that the liquidator owes a duty to the creditors as a 
whole, otherwise known as the concursus creditorum.36 The following dictum of 
Innes JA in the case of Walker v Syfret37 is considered the locus classicus on the 
effect of a concursus creditorum, namely:  
... the hand of the law is laid upon the estate, and at once the rights of the general 
body of creditors have to be taken into consideration. No transaction can thereafter 
be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single creditor to the prejudice 
of the general body.38 
The nature of a liquidator's functions were also considered in the matter of James v 
The Magistrate Wynberg.39 Before pronouncing on the fiduciary duty of a liquidator 
to the creditors, the court considered obiter whether or not a liquidator ought to be 
considered an officer of the court in South African law.40 In doing so the court 
referred to the judgment of Coetzee J in Gilbert v Bekker,41 from which it is evident 
that Coetzee J did not place much value on such a distinction: 
To refer to a trustee as an officer of the Court seems to me inappropriate as he is 
just the holder of one of a host of offices created by various statutes such as 
directors, executors, mayors, town clerks, etc. But even if it is felt that he qualifies 
for this honour, there are no legal consequences which flow from that position, qua 
officer, nor powers to prescribe how he should perform his job. The furthest that 
one can take it is to feel free to censure him, when occasion demands, for conduct 
not becoming an officer and a gentleman, which seems to be just about the same 
thing, with as little legal content.42 
In any event, the court in the James matter did not find it necessary to determine 
whether or not a liquidator is an officer of the court in South Africa, as the matter 
was decided on the basis that:  
                                        
36  Swart Rol van 'n Concursus Creditorum 281; Nel v Master of the High Court 2002 ZASCA 4 (8 
March 2002) para 6; Cf Richter v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 209 223. 
37  Walker v Syfret 1911 AD 141. 
38  Walker v Syfret 1911 AD 141 166. 
39  James v Magistrate Wynberg 1995 1 SA 1 (C), hereafter referred to as "James v Magistrate 
Wynberg". See also Standard Bank of South Africa v The Master of the High Court 2010 4 SA 
405 (SCA), hereafter referred to as "Standard Bank v The Master". 
40  James v Magistrate Wynberg 13 I- J. 
41  Gilbert v Bekker 1984 3 SA 774 (W) 777 F-G, 778 A-B. 
42  Gilbert v Bekker 1984 3 SA 774 (W) 781E-F. 
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…whatever his status he stands in a fiduciary relationship both to the company of 
which he is the liquidator and to the body of its members as a whole, as well as to 
the body of its creditors as a whole.43  
What turned out to be of greater importance in the James matter was the fact that 
the liquidator is expected to be detached, independent, impartial and even-handed 
in his dealings and must also be seen to be so.44 This was considered to be 
particularly important when considering the "far-reaching machinery of 
interrogation" created by the Companies Act, giving rise to a sui generis procedure 
where the powers of the liquidator are "extraordinary and inquisitorial in nature".45 
The impartiality of a liquidator is a safeguard against the potential abuse of the 
examination procedure. 
Whether a liquidator is an officer of the court in South African law still remains 
uncertain.46 It should also be noted that as was mentioned in the Gilbert case our 
courts are not entrusted with insolvency administration as is the case in England 
where it is fundamentally the court's function.47 With regard to the liquidator's legal 
position as to subsequent ethical standards, Mars asserts that an insolvency 
practitioner is not an officer of the court but does occupy a position of trust not only 
towards the creditors but also towards the insolvent himself.48 As stated above, the 
court in the Kebble matter expressed the view that the Commissioner "as an officer 
of the Court" should disallow abusive questions.49 It is submitted, in line with the 
decision in the James matter, that it will not advance standards in the winding-up 
                                        
43 James v Magistrate Wynberg 13I-J, 14A where the Court referred to the following matters as 
authority for this proposition: Re Corporation, Gooch's Case 1872 7 Ch App 207; Caroline 
Trekkers en Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Venter 1982 2 PH E9 (A); Fey and Whiteford v Serfontein 
1993 2 SA 605 (A); Ex parte Klopper: In re Sogervim SA (Pty) Ltd (in Liq) (Sogervim SA 
Intervening) 1971 3 SA 791 (T); Concorde Leasing Corporation (Rhodesia) Ltd v Pringle-Wood 
1975 4 SA 231 (R). 
44  James v Magistrate Wynberg 14D. See also Standard Bank v The Master 405: "In the winding-up 
of companies liquidators occupy a position of trust, not only towards creditors but also the 
companies in liquidation whose assets vests in them. Liquidators are required to act in the best 
interests of creditors. A liquidator should be wholly independent, should regard equally the 
interests of all creditors, and should carry out his or her duties without fear, favour or prejudice." 
45  James v Magistrate Wynberg 15C-D. 
46  English tradition and most common law jurisdictions consecutively consider an office-holder to be 
an office of the court. Finch Corporate Insolvency Law 378. See also Insolvency Act, 1986 ss 
117(5), 400(2) and Schedule B1. 
47  Gilbert v Bekker 777F-G. 
48  Bertelsmann Mars: Law of Insolvency 293. 
49  Kebble v Gainsford para 87. 
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process to make a liquidator an officer of the court. A statutory obligation on the 
liquidator to act in a fiduciary capacity towards the body of creditors as a whole and 
to carry out his duties in an independent, impartial and even-handed way will, it is 
submitted, be more effective in order to regulate the liquidator's conduct.50 
It is noteworthy that the focus of the liquidator's duties falls squarely on his 
responsibility to determine assets. Whilst one must concede that this is an important 
duty, there are other objectives in insolvency which warrant consideration. One such 
duty is the need to investigate the cause of the failure of a company. Calitz51 notes 
the following in this regard: 
Another disparity that one notices when examining the functions of the Master 
within the context of international standards is the lack of investigative powers of 
the Master relating to the cause of the insolvency. In most foreign jurisdictions the 
examination into the cause of insolvency, which also includes the behaviour of the 
insolvent prior to the sequestration of his estate, represents a major objective in 
the justification of these regulatory institutions. Customarily, the investigative 
process of insolvency law is also established as a public policy measure. Although 
the South African system hosts a strong interrogation procedure, the investigative 
powers of the Master are limited to the general enquiries afforded by the Act, which 
generally aims to obtain information on the financial affairs of the insolvent and the 
whereabouts of property. Being able to determine the cause of insolvency not only 
has the advantage of separating the bona fide insolvent from the person abusing 
the system, but in the context of law reform will also have substantial scientific and 
empirical value.52 
2.6  Sanctions against a liquidator 
Should the liquidator fail to perform his duties or comply with a reasonable demand 
by the Master for information or proof required by him in connection with the 
liquidation of the company, the Master or any person having an interest in the 
company, after giving the liquidator at least two weeks' notice, can apply to the 
Court for an order directing the liquidator to perform such a duty or comply with 
such a demand.53 The liquidator runs the risk of having a costs order de bonis 
propriis against him.54 The liquidator may also be removed by the Master and by the 
                                        
50  See Calitz Reformatory Approach part VII for a detailed discussion. 
51  Calitz 2011 De Jure 290. 
52  Calitz 2011 De Jure 299. 
53  Companies Act s 405. 
54  Companies Act s 405(2). See alsoThorn v The Master 1964 3 SA 38 (N) 52-53. 
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Court if he has failed to perform any duty imposed upon him satisfactorily or to 
comply with a lawful demand by the Master or if the majority of the creditors (or 
members in the case of a member's voluntary winding-up) have requested him to do 
so.55 A court may, on application by the Master or any interested person, remove a 
liquidator from office if the Master fails to do so in any of the circumstances 
mentioned in the act or for any other good cause.56 It is significant that no action for 
damages can be brought against a liquidator for failing to do his duties. A liquidator 
may himself not be questioned in terms of a section 417 procedure.57  
2.7  The objectives of the section 417 examination 
The essence of section 417 is contained in its purpose, and the purpose of the 
section in turn justifies its means. Although much can be said about the sui generis 
nature and the far-reaching scope of the examination, every matter concerning 
section 417 returns to this crucial point, namely the weighing up of perceived 
injustices against the purpose of the section. In outlining the objectives of the 
section 417 examination, Levenberg AJ in Kebble's case again referred extensively to 
the matter of Bernstein, where Ackerman J summarised the objectives of a section 
417 and 418 examination. In Bernstein it is noted that the section in particular is 
aimed at assisting liquidators in achieving their primary goal, namely to determine 
assets as quickly and cheaply as possible, and to pay the liabilities.58 Ackerman J 
further notes that the section confers an ancillary power on liquidators to look into 
                                        
55  Companies Act s 379 (1)(b). See also Standard Bank v The Master. 
56  Companies Act s 379 (2). In terms of s 379 (2) the court may remove a liquidator from office 
where there is good cause for removal. Meskin further states that: "'Good cause', in this context, 
would include, it is submitted, misconduct of any kind not covered by any of the provisions of 
sections 373 or 379(1) of the Companies Act; but 'cause', it is submitted, should not be confined 
to misconduct or personal unfitness for office; it includes any conduct which is such that the 
Court is able to conclude that it would be to the advantage of all the persons interested in the 
winding-up that the removal should ensue, having regard to the true interests of the winding-up 
and the purpose for which the liquidator is appointed." (In re Adam Eyton Limited; Ex parte 
Charlesworth 1887 36 Ch 299 (CA) 303-304, 306; Greenacre's Executors v Kemp 1916 TPD 247 
255; James v Magistrate Wynberg 14 and cases there cited; Standard Bank v The Master para 
10). See also Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 4.34; Calitz 2011 Obiter 747-759. 
57  However, see s 152(2) of the Insolvency Act, where the Act also makes provision for an inquiry 
to be instituted by the Master, whenever he is of the opinion that the insolvent, the trustee, or 
any other person is able to give information which he (the Master) considers desirable to obtain 
concerning the insolvent, his estate, the administration of his estate, or any claim or demand 
made against the estate (s 152(2)). See also Bertelsmann Mars: Law of Insolvency 430. 
58  Bernstein v Bester para 16. 
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the company's affairs, to obtain clarity on claims that they wish to pursue, or to 
determine the general credibility of an examinee before embarking on a trial. The 
disadvantages faced by liquidators, their lack of knowledge of the company's affairs, 
their reliance on records which are often inadequately kept, and their dependence 
on members of the company as sources of information are noted. The list of 
objectives set out by Ackerman J is not novel, but is a restatement and affirmation 
of what previous decisions have determined the purpose of the section to be, as 
discussed further below. 
That the purpose of the section is clear and unequivocal is substantiated by the fact 
that cases have consistently noted the purpose of the section in a similar manner. 
This was again seen in the very recent matter of P Nyathi v M P Cloete,59 where the 
court had to consider the purpose of section 417, and in doing so it referred to a 
number of cases that pronounced on the objects of the section 417. The purpose of 
this section was variously noted to be the following: to assist officers of the Court in 
performing their duty to creditors, the Master and the court,60 to determine the most 
advantageous course to adopt in regard to the liquidation of the company,61 to assist 
the liquidator with the primary goal of winding-up, which is to identify the assets and 
liabilities and to administer them to the advantage of the creditors,62 to provide the 
company with information about its affairs, claims and liabilities which the company's 
officers fail or refuse to make available,63 and to piece together information in order 
to assist the winding-up process.64 In another recent matter, Kawie v The Master of 
the High Court,65 it is simply noted that the purpose of the section is to investigate 
the affairs of the company. The overall tenet of these decisions is that the purpose 
of section 417 is to obtain information. These recent interpretations of the purposes 
                                        
59  P Nyathi v M P Cloete 2012 6 SA 631 (GSJ), hereafter referred to as "Nyathi v Cloete". 
60  Lynn v Kreuger 1995 2 SA 940 (N) 944F. 
61  Western Bank Ltd v Thorne 1973 3 SA 661 (C) 666F. 
62  Merchant Shippers SA (Pty) Ltd v Millman 1986 1 SA 413 (C) 417D-E. 
63  Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC). 
64  Leech v Farber 2000 2 SA 444 (W) 450J, hereafter referred to as Leech v Farber. 
65  Kawie v The Master of the High Court unreported case number 21353/2011 WC of 3 November 
2011. 
Y JOUBERT AND J CALITZ  PER / PELJ  2014(17)3 
902 
 
of the section have not varied from those noted more than 40 years ago in the 
English matter of Re Rolls Razor Ltd66 where the following was stated: 
The process ... is needed because of the difficulty in which the liquidator in an 
insolvent company is necessarily placed. He usually comes as a stranger to the 
affairs of the company which has sunk to its financial doom. In that process, it may 
well be that some of those concerned in the management of the company, and 
others as well, have been guilty of some misconduct or impropriety which is of 
relevance to the liquidation. Even those who were wholly innocent of any 
wrongdoing may have motives for concealing what was done. In any case there are 
almost certain to be many transactions which are difficult to discover or to 
understand merely from the books and papers of the company. Accordingly the 
Legislator has provided this extra-ordinary process so as to enable the requisite 
information to be obtained.67 
2.8  Responsibility to account 
The last purpose of section 417 referred to by Ackerman J in the Bernstein matter 
comprises the responsibility of those who obtain funds from the public to account for 
how those funds were spent.68 In another matter, Ferreira v Levin, Vryenhoek v 
Powell,69 Sachs J stated as follows: 
Company directors and other officials who appeal to the public for funds and 
engage in public commercial activity with the benefit of not being personally liable 
for company debts, cannot complain if they are subsequently called upon to 
account for their stewardship… Indeed, it would be ironical if crooked directors 
were more able to avoid submitting themselves to an examination than honest 
ones.70 
Ackerman J's comments raise the question of to whom directors owe a responsibility 
to account.71 It appears to be suggested that directors must account to the public or 
that directors in general must be accountable for their actions. It is trite that a 
director is accountable only to the shareholders of the company. This position is 
confirmed in the Companies Act 71 of 2008,72 which prescribes that a director must 
                                        
66  Re Rolls Razor Ltd (2) 1970 a Ch 576, hereafter referred to as Re Rolls Razor Ltd. 
67  Nyathi v Cloete para 591-592. 
68  Bernstein v Bester para 85. See also Mitchell v Hodes 2003 3 SA 176 (C). 
69  See Ferreira v Levin. 
70  Ferreira v Levin para 261. 
71  See Bekink 2008 SA Merc LJ 95; Feinstein 2010 De Rebus 43; Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263; 
Van der Linde 2008 SA Merc LJ 439; Van der Linde "South Africa". 
72  The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter referred to as "2008 Act" or "2008 Companies 
Act") came into effect on 1 May 2011. The winding-up of insolvent companies continue to be 
regulated - Chapter 14 of the 1973 Act, incorporating provisions of the Insolvency Act, while the 
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act in the best interests of the company,73 i.e. the body of shareholders as a whole. 
The interests of other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, the 
community and the environment, have received no formal recognition under the new 
Companies Act and the duties of directors are focused on maximising shareholder 
wealth.74 Should a director fail in his duties, there are provisions in the new 
Companies Act that will call him to account.75 A company in existence owes no duties 
to its creditors. This position naturally changes upon liquidation when the concursus 
creditorum is established, but at that point the duties of the director have ceased, 
other than the duties to attend meetings.76 It is exactly for this reason that the 
examination in terms of section 417 is of such value, as it is the only means to gain 
information from a director. It is therefore submitted that Ackerman J's comments 
on the responsibility of directors to account to the company's affairs refers to a 
director's duty to attend at enquiries such as the section 417 enquiries. 
Furthermore, when one considers the prevailing economic situation it seems crucial 
to maintain a section such as section 417 in order to counterbalance the prevalence 
of white-collar crime and fraud in our society. In the Bernstein matter, Ackerman J 
took judicial notice of "the particularly high crime rate…currently prevalent in South 
Africa", as well as the collapse and liquidation of companies that were of concern to 
the state, and noted that this gave added weight to the argument that liquidators 
should act efficiently, quickly and prudently with assets to protect the interests of 
creditors and the public at large.77  
                                                                                                                          
winding-up of solvent companies is addressed in the new Act. Chapter 14, with certain 
exceptions, continues to apply to the winding-up and liquidation of companies as if the 1973 Act 
had not been repealed (s 224(3) read with item 9(1) Schedule 5 of the 2008 Act). The chapter is 
to remain in effect until alternative legislation adequately providing for the winding-up and 
liquidation of insolvent companies has been put in operation (item 9(4)(a) Schedule 5 of the 
2008 Act). However, certain provisions (ss 343, 344, 346 and 348-353) do not apply to solvent 
companies except to the extent necessary to give full effect to ss 79-83 of the 2008 Act (item 
9(2) Schedule 5 of the 2008 Act). 
73  Companies Act 2008 s 76(3)(b). 
74  Cassim Contemporary Company Law 517. See also Luiz and Taljaard 2009 SA Merc LJ 420. 
75  The fiduciary duties of directors are derived from our common law, and while the 2008 Act 
attempts to codify some of these common law duties, it is only a partial codification of the 
common law. See eg Companies Act 2008 ss 22 (1); 20(6); 77(3)(b); 77(9) and 218(2). 
76 Companies Act s 414(1). 
77  Bernstein v Bester para 151.  
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Again, in the matter of Mitchell v Hodes78 it was highlighted that the honest conduct 
of companies was a matter of great public concern, requiring the exposure of 
dishonest conduct, especially since the liquidation is frequently the result of 
mismanagement involving fraud on the part of the directors and other officers of the 
company.79 These persons are often the only ones to have details of the pre-
liquidation business affairs of the company. It is especially in these cases that an exa 
2.9 Aspects which safeguard against the abuse of the section 
2.9.1 Balance of rights 
Unless the court or, as the case may be, the Master, were to direct otherwise, 
section 417(7) operates to deny all persons access to the application and any 
documents accompanying it and to the examination or enquiry itself, the record of it, 
and to any books or papers produced at it.80 In Merchant Shippers SA v Millman81 the 
court stated that there was good reason for the preservation of secrecy, not only 
with regard to the examination, but also the application for the enquiry. The judge 
underlined that the motive for the enquiry was to enable the liquidator to seek and 
recover assets to the advantage of creditors. If the information regarding the 
application and the matters which were to be inquired were to be made public this 
would complicate the task of the liquidator considerably.82 
It is submitted that the balance to be achieved between the giving of the 
information requested and possible hardship to the examinee goes to the heart of 
the purpose of section 417. Ackerman J in Bernstein, as quoted in the Kebble 
                                        
78  Mitchell v Hodes (n 69 
79  Mitchell v Hodes 48. 
80  Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 8.5.2 and see Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial 
Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 389 (D&CLD). Meskin states that "it should be noted that this 
position may now have changed in light of the provisions of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 which obliges public and private bodies to make information available 
in specific circumstances. In terms of s 5 of this Act, its provisions override those of other 
legislation that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of a record and which is materially 
inconsistent with an object or specific provision of such Act." Meskin al Insolvency Law para 
8.5.2.  
81  Merchant Shippers SA v Millman 1986 1 SA 413 (C). 
82  Merchant Shippers SA v Millman 414 G-H. 
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matter, refers to an English decision, Cloverbay,83 where the Court of Appeal 
highlighted the balance between the requirements of the liquidator and possible 
oppression to the person to be examined.84 The court pointed out that where the 
information requested is fundamental to the winding-up process, the balance would 
clearly weigh in favour of an examination, but if the liquidator wanted to merely "dot 
the i's and cross the t's on a fairly clear claim" the balance would lie against him.85 
Conceding that few cases will be this plainly weighted, it is noted that a court will 
have to exercise its discretion as to whether or not to order an examination. The 
court outlined certain guidelines for the exercise of such discretion, as follows: 
The first consideration is that the purpose of the provisions is to enable the 
liquidator to reconstitute the state of knowledge to the company in order to make 
informed decisions. The purpose is not to place the company in a stronger position 
in civil litigation than it would have enjoyed in the absence of liquidation. Second, 
the appropriate strategy is not to require proof of the absolute need for information 
before an order of examination will be granted, but proof of a reasonable 
requirement of information. Third, the case for examination would be much 
stronger against officers or former directors of the company, who owe the company 
a fiduciary duty, than against third parties. Fourth, an order for oral examination is 
more likely to operate against an examinee than an order for the production of 
documents. The court is also likely to treat an application for the holding of a s 417 
examination from an office holder, such as the liquidator, with more sympathy than 
it would treat a similar request from a contributor…86 
The court concluded by stating that a clear case of abuse had to be established 
before a discharge from a subpoena could be ordered. As stated above, Kebble 
failed to establish any abuse. On the contrary, it was found that this was a clear 
case where an examination was patently indicated, for the reasons set out above in 
the discussion of the judgment.  
Applicants wishing to set aside an order in terms of section 417 must prove that the 
statutory balance does not protect them properly. It is the Master who determines 
the relevance of the documents requested and not the party seeking to prevent 
disclosure.87 In the Gumede88 matter, where the application was for the production of 
                                        
83  Cloverbay. 
84  Cloverbay 102a. 
85  Cloverbay 102a. 
86  Kebble v Gainsford 29. 
87  Akoo v Master of the High Court 2012 ZAKZPHC 45 (31 July 2012). 
88  Gumede v Subel 2006 3 SA 498 (SCA).  
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documents, the court held that the relevance of the documents requested trumped 
the right to privacy.89 The decision was premised on the balance between the harm 
to a person summoned to produce books or papers in his custody and the 
importance of the documents sought.90  
In Mitchell's case the court was dealing with the aspect of self-incrimination.91 The 
following was noted regarding the balance between oppression to the examinee and 
the need to obtain information: 
To my mind, the inevitable tension between the rights of an examinee in section 
417 proceedings (in particular, the broad right to a fair trial of an examinee who is 
also an accused person) and the indubitable public interest in the proper 
examination of corporate collapses, has been adequately and fairly balanced by the 
Constitutional Court by the introduction of a direct use immunity, and by making 
the use of derivative evidence at a subsequent criminal trial subject to the 
discretion of the trial judge (whose duty it is to ensure compliance with fair criminal 
trial standards).92 
Direct and derivative use immunity refers to the fact that a witness' own evidence 
cannot be used against himself or herself, unless such evidence is substantiated 
independently. This immunity differs from blanket immunity, which is an undertaking 
not to prosecute the witness. By allowing the use of derivate evidence, flexibility has 
been retained in that the trial judge may decide whether to admit the evidence or 
not. It also avoids immunity baths where a witness offers up evidence in order to 
side-step future prosecution. In terms of section 417(2)(b) any person may be 
required to answer any question put to him or her at the examination, 
notwithstanding that the answer may incriminate him or her. A person shall be 
obliged to answer at the instance of the Master or the Court, provided that the 
Master or the Court has consulted with the Director of Public Prosecutions who has 
jurisdiction.93 Academic writers have criticized the requirement to involve the Director 
                                        
89  Gumede v Subel 2006 3 SA 498 (SCA) 505. 
90  Calitz 2006 Obiter 403- 409. 
91  Mitchell v Hodes. Also see Parboo v Getz 1997 4 SA 1095 (CC).  
92  Mitchell v Hodes 53. 
93  S 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act was amended in 2002. 
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of Public Prosecutions, on the basis that this may unnecessarily stultify 
proceedings.94 
2.9.2  Abuse of process 
The court has the inherent power, both at common law and in terms of section 173 
of the Constitution95 to regulate its own process, including the right to prevent an 
abuse of its process in the form of frivolous or vexatious litigation.96 The court can 
interfere and declare the exercise of power invalid only where it is shown that the 
repository of the power acted mala fide or from ulterior motive or failed to apply his 
mind to the matter.97 In evaluating if there is an abuse the court is required to 
cumulatively weigh up all of the factors both for and against the holding of an 
examination. Whether there is an abuse or not will in all instances depend on the 
circumstances of the case. The court thus has the power to prevent the oppressive, 
vexatious and unfair use of section 417 proceedings.98 In the matter of Leech v 
Farber,99 Nugent J stated this unequivocally as follows: 
As long as enquiries of this nature have been permitted by legislation in this 
country, the courts have had the power to intervene in order to supervise the 
manner in which they have been conducted.100 
The liquidator must apply his mind in order to determine if a legitimate purpose 
exists and that sufficient cause is made out for the enquiry to take place. Should he 
not do so, he runs the risk of the court's declaring that the enquiry amounts to an 
abuse of process.101 However, a witness does not have a right to being given a list of 
questions prior to a section 417 hearing.102 An opportunity should be given to the 
witness to consult the documents and to consider a reply, but it is not necessary for 
                                        
94  Meskin et al Insolvency Law para 5.8.2 
95  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereafter referred to as "the Constitution". In 
terms of s 1(2) of the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act 5 of 2005, which came into operation on 
27 June 2005, all references to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
have been replaced by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
96  Cassimjee v Minister of Finance 2012 ZASCA 101 (1 June 2012) para 8. 
97  Strauss v The Master 2001 1 SA 649 (T) 657A. 
98  Bernstein v Bester 776G. 
99  Leech v Farber . 
100  Leech v Farber 451C-D. 
101  Laskarides v German Tyre Centre (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 390 (W). 
102  Nyathi v Cloete. 
Y JOUBERT AND J CALITZ  PER / PELJ  2014(17)3 
908 
 
him to prepare for an enquiry as for an academic examination.103 Where applicants 
have averred that the subpoenas issued against them were vague in that they failed 
to specify the nature of the documents that were required, this was rejected by the 
court.104 The mere fact that a variety of documents is required does not mean that 
the request for documents was vague.  
2.9.3  Oral or written interrogatories 
The Master or the Court may examine any person summoned on oath or affirmation 
concerning any matter referred to in subsection (1), either orally or on written 
interrogatories and may reduce his answers to writing and require him to sign 
them.105 The recent Nyathi106 matter dealt with a review of a decision not to allow the 
examination of the applicants in an examination in terms of section 417 and 418 by 
written interrogatory. The applicants further wanted an order setting aside the 
subpoenas issued in terms of section 417. The court pointed out that it has a 
discretion whether to proceed by means of an oral interrogation as opposed to a 
written interrogatory and that there must be good reason for having a written 
examination rather than an oral examination.107 The court again referred to the 
English matter of Re Rolls Razor Ltd,108 where it was held that one must look at the 
facts as a whole, without yielding to preconceptions.109 In the Nyathi matter it was 
held that a written interrogatory may be indicated where the information sought is 
merely formal in nature. In other circumstances, a written interrogatory as a 
precursor to oral examination may be more suitable.110 However, one should be 
disinclined to take the written interrogatory route when this would undermine the 
object and purpose of the examination, especially where the failure of the company 
was, on the face of it, caused by the fraudulent actions of the directors.111 In such 
instances it would be counterproductive not to get the necessary information from 
                                        
103  Lategan v Lategan 2003 6 SA 611 (D). 
104  Nyathi v Cloete. 
105  S 417 (2A)(a) of the Companies Act. 
106  Nyathi v Cloete. 
107  Nyathi v Cloete para 7. 
108  Re Rolls Razor Ltd. 
109  Re Rolls Razor Ltd para 6. 
110  Re Rolls Razor Ltd para 6. See also Leech v Faber 451A-B. 
111  The court referred to the matter of Lynn v Krueger 1995 2 SA 940 944F-I. 
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the directors themselves, as quickly as possible, as they may be the only sources of 
information as to the pre-liquidation affairs of the company. In the Nyathi matter 
there was a typical absence of information, a lack of financial documents and 
information of the insolvent company, and a lack of co-operation from the directors. 
So little persuaded was the court that the application in the Nyathi matter was "ill 
conceived" that costs on a punitive scale were awarded against the applicants. 
In the Draft Insolvency Bill,112 clauses 417 and 418 have been retained in clause 65 
and 66. Van der Linde and Boraine113 note that the provisions of the draft bill are 
similar to sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act, with certain innovations. One 
such novelty is found in clause 67, which empowers the liquidator to put written 
questions to the insolvent, creditors and other witnesses. Answers to such questions 
are treated as evidence given at an interrogation. The authors note that this 
procedure should save time and money.114 In response to their viewpoint, reference 
is made to the Nyathi decision discussed above, where the court noted that written 
interrogatories are not appropriate in all cases and that there is a risk that necessary 
information which could be elicited by means of oral evidence may not be exposed. 
2.9.4  Conclusion 
It can be seen that section 417 must be interpreted in order to give effect to the 
liquidator's duties, namely to determine and realize as many assets as possible and 
to assist the Master to expose any offences, to determine if directors are to be 
disqualified, and to determine the cause of failure of the company, where applicable. 
It is significant that the courts give the duty to collect assets more weight than any 
of the liquidator's other duties. In the Kebble matter the court raised the point that 
directors should have a duty to account to the public, but it is submitted that the 
main focus of the liquidator remains to collect and distribute assets. The wide 
discretion that the court has in terms of section 417 is balanced by a weighing of the 
interests of the parties and the fact that the court will not allow an abuse of process. 
                                        
112  SALC Review of the Law of Insolvency (Volume 2) Draft Bill. 
113  Boraine and Van der Linde 1999 TSAR 38. 
114  Boraine and Van der Linde 1999 TSAR 45. 
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It is important not to place too many checks and balances in a procedure based on 
discretion, as this may counter the very effectiveness of the section. 
3 Comparison with English law 
3.1  Introduction 
This part contains the comparative aspect of the study and takes a concise look at 
the English provision for private examinations, namely section 236 of the Insolvency 
Act, 1986.115 As has been noted above, South African insolvency law has a strong 
link to English insolvency law, as is evidenced by the seminal English cases that are 
still referred to and relied on by our courts, including the Constitutional Court, in 
reaching their decisions.  
3.2  Section 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
Section 236 of the Insolvency Act, 1986116 regulates private examinations. According 
to this section the court may, on the application of the office holder, summon to 
appear before it any officer of the company, any person known or suspected to have 
in his possession any property of the company or supposed to be indebted to the 
company or any person whom the court thinks capable of giving information 
concerning the promotion, formation, business, dealings, affairs or property of the 
company.117 "Office holder" means the administrator, the administrative receiver, the 
liquidator or provisional liquidator,118 but also has an extended meaning to include 
the official receiver.119 For Rajak the most striking feature of the section is the fact 
                                        
115  For the purpose of clarifying nomenclature it should be noted that English insolvency law makes 
provision for a number of regimes, including voluntary winding-up, winding-up by court, 
receivership, administration and voluntary arrangements, with the result that the insolvency 
practitioner may be variously referred to as an administrative receiver, administrator, nominee or 
supervisor, liquidator or provisional liquidator, the office holder, official receiver etc. I have not 
reduced these varying terms to a standard terminology such as "the practitioner", but have 
reproduced the nomenclature used in the act, the case or the text that I refer to without 
alteration. 
116  Hereafter referred to as the "Insolvency Act, 1986". 
117  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 234 (2). 
118  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 234 (1). 
119  Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd 2004 1 AC 158. 
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that anyone can be summoned under it, provided that person is capable of giving 
information concerning the affairs of the company.120 
The onus of proving that the information is reasonably required rests on the office 
holder. His burden is eased by the fact that the court regards the views of the office 
holder with "a good deal of weight".121 Factors which are relevant are the stage of 
the insolvency process, the importance of the information required and the purpose 
for which it is required, the proximity of the relationship between the respondent 
and the insolvent, whether the order is for an oral examination or an order to 
produce documents, self-incrimination, and the entitlement of a respondent to 
documents.122 Finch notes that the power to examine is not designed to offer 
liquidators special advantages in ordinary litigation and should not be used 
oppressively.123 
3.3  Scope of the application 
The scope of section 236 is premised upon the discretion of the court. Sealy and 
Milman comment that the court's discretion under section 236 is unfettered,124 yet 
circumscribed by the overriding requirements that the examination should be 
necessary in the interests of winding-up, and that it should not be oppressive or 
unfair to the respondent.125 It has been noted that, in view of the fact that the 
legislature saw fit to award a discretion to the court in respect of private enquiries, it 
would be counterproductive to classify all the occasions upon which it may be proper 
to make an order.126 The section has been held to be very useful and as such it was 
unnecessary and undesirable to limit its scope.127 A principal authority on the scope 
of section 236 is the decision of the House of Lords in British & Commonwealth 
                                        
120  Rajak Company Liquidations 307. 
121  Sasea Finance Ltd v KPMG 1998 BCC 216 220. See Finch Corporate Insolvency Law 565. 
122  Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd 2004 1 AC 158. 
123  Finch Corporate Insolvency Law 565, where reference is made to the matter of Re Embassy Art 
Products Ltd 1987 3 BCC 292. 
124  Possibly referring to the judgment in In re Rolls Razor Ltd 592, where reference was made to 
"the unfettered discretion of the judge brought to bear upon any exercise of this extraordinary 
jurisdiction". See Sealy and Milman Annotated Guide 258. 
125  Sealy and Milman Annotated Guide 259. 
126  In re North Australian Territory Co 1890 45 ChD 87 92. 
127  In re Highgrade Trades Ltd 1984 BCLC 151 177. 
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Holdings plc v Spicer and Oppenheim.128 In this case very extensive information had 
been requested and the respondents objected to the wide terms of the order, 
claiming this to be oppressive.129 The main issue for the court to decide was if the 
jurisdiction under section 236 was limited to make provision for such information as 
would have been available to the company but for its insolvency, based on the 
"reconstitution of knowledge" argument.130 It was accepted that at least some of the 
information requested was information that the company would not have been 
entitled to. In the principal judgment it was held that there was no such limitation in 
jurisdiction and no rule establishing such a limitation had been held down in the 
decision of Cloverbay.131 Mayson noted that the court has the power to order the 
production of books, papers and records relating to the company even if they are 
not in the company's property and the company itself could not have obtained 
them.132 The scope of the section is such that it can be used even against an official 
receiver himself, as noted by Rajak with reference to the case of Re John T. Rhodes 
Ltd,133 namely that the receiver is liable to be summoned to appear before the court 
to provide an account of his dealings as receiver.134 
  
                                        
128  British and Commonwealth Holdings plc v Spicer and Oppenheim 1993 AC 426, hereafter 
referred as "British and Commonwealth Holdings". 
129  This summary of the British and Commonwealth Holdings matter is included in the judgment of 
Cowlishaw v O & D Building Contractors Ltd 2009 EWHC 2445 (Ch). 
130  It was also held in the case of Cowlishaw and Wong v O & D Building Contractors Ltd 2009 
EWHC 2445 (Ch) that the court's power of private examination is wide and can include any 
person the court thinks is capable of providing information regarding the company's promotion, 
formation, business, dealings, affairs and property. In In re Highgrade Trades Ltd1984 BCLC 
151, Oliver LJ in relation to s 268 said, at para 177: "the jurisdiction is a most useful one, and I 
certainly do not wish to say, and it is unnecessary to say, anything which would limit its scope". 
In In re John T Rhodes Ltd 1986 2 BCC 99,284, 286, Hoffmann J again emphasised the 
discretionary nature of an order made under s 561 of the Companies Act, 1985, the successor of 
s 268 of the Act of 1948. 
131  Cloverbay . 
132  French, Mayson and Ryan Company Law 747 referring to Re Trading Partners Ltd 2002 1 BCLC 
655. 
133  In re John T Rhodes Ltd 1986 2 BCC 99. 
134  Rajak Company Liquidations 338. 
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3.4 Purpose of the examination 
The case of British and Commonwealth Holdings135 addressed the purpose of the 
section 236 examination.136 The court approved the dictum of Buckley J in In Re 
Rolls Razor Ltd137 to the effect that the purpose of the section is to obtain 
information that the liquidator, as a stranger to the company, may not be privy to.138 
The dictum of Buckley J was also referred to in the Kebble matter and is quoted 
above and will therefore not be repeated here. In summary, the purposes of the 
section as set out in the In re Rolls matter are as follows: to assist the office holder 
to "discover the truth", so that he complete his function as effectively and with little 
expense as possible, to put the affairs of the insolvent estate in order, to identify 
and recover assets and to discover facts surrounding potential claims, including 
claims against the potential respondent to the application. In the British & 
Commonwealth 139 matter counsel for the appellants summarized the purpose of the 
section as follows: 
The office holder faces the obvious difficulty or disadvantage that he is a stranger to 
the company's affairs. This is the "mischief" at which section 236 is aimed: the 
section overcomes the difficulty or disadvantage by allowing the office holder to 
acquire (cheaply and, if appropriate, quickly) the knowledge that the company over 
which is he is appointed should possess. The section remedies disadvantage rather 
than confers advantage.140 
The above quotation is included here, as it is submitted that the formulation by 
counsel to the effect that section 236 does not confer additional advantages to a 
liquidator but rather redresses an imbalance that exists due to the fact that the 
liquidator is a stranger to the company aids our understanding of the true purpose of 
section 236.  
                                        
135  British and Commonwealth Holdings. 
136  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 575. 
137  In re Rolls Razor Ltd. 
138  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 575. 
139  British and Commonwealth Holdings. 
140  British and Commonwealth Holdings 428. 
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Goode identifies the objectives of English corporate insolvency law as restoring the 
company to profitable trading, maximising returns to creditors, providing a fair and 
equitable system for the ranking of claims, identifying the causes of the company's 
failure, and imposing sanctions for culpable management by its directors and 
officers.141 What can thus be added to the purposes of section 236 discussed above 
is the aim of obtaining evidence for use in directors' disqualification proceedings. 
This aspect is addressed more fully below under the discussion of the duties of the 
official receiver.  
3.5  Duties of the official receiver 
An official receiver's duties are not confined to the determination of the assets of the 
company, but include an investigation of the affairs of the company.142 Mayson notes 
that a person who is appointed as a practitioner in a company insolvency is usually 
unfamiliar with the company but must take charge of it very quickly, and the 
legislation therefore makes several provisions for information about the company to 
be provided to the practitioner.143 One such provision is section 131 of the Insolvency 
Act. In terms of this provision the official receiver may require a person to submit a 
statement as to the affairs of the company.144 The official receiver has the duty to 
investigate if the company has failed and also to investigate more generally the 
promotion, formation, business, dealings and affairs of the company and to make 
such a report as he thinks fit.145 The official receiver has a discretion as to whether to 
submit a report or not, and if his investigation reveals no misconduct a report may 
dispensed with.146 However, if he does submit a report, it may play a significant part 
in proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986,147 
alternatively proceedings in terms of the Insolvency Act, 1986 concerning wrongful 
                                        
141  Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 59-63. 
142  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 132. See Fletcher Law of Insolvency 707. 
143  French, Mayson and Ryan Company Law 744. 
144  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 131. Such a person can be an officer, employee or former employee of 
the company. The particulars that can be requested include particulars of the company's assets 
and liabilities, the names and addresses of the company's creditors, the securities held by the 
creditors and such further information as the official receiver may require. 
145  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 132. 
146  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 452. 
147  Hereafter referred to as "Company Directors Disqualification Act". 
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trading, dispositions without value, voidable preferences, extortionate credit 
transactions or proceedings for remedies against delinquent directors.148 Goode 
points out that the insolvency of a company affects creditors, employees and the 
Government, which loses out on taxes and, accordingly, insolvency law imposes an 
obligation on liquidators to investigate the cause of failure of a company and the 
imposition of applicable sanctions.149  
3.6  Section 235 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
The official receiver is assisted in his duty by section 235 of the Insolvency Act, 
1986, which creates a duty to co-operate with the office-holder.150 This section notes 
that each person mentioned in section 236 shall give to the office holder such 
information concerning the company and its affairs or property as the office holder 
may reasonably require, failing which a fine may be imposed.151 No prescribed 
procedure is required in terms of section 235 and the office holder may merely 
contact the relevant person requesting his attendance or the information that he 
requires.152  
In the matter of RGB Resources plc153 it was held that section 236 should be read 
together with section 235, but it noted that section 235 contained a mandatory 
obligation on an officer to give the information reasonably required, whereas the 
court retained a discretion to order a private examination under section 236.154 
Section 236 is wider reaching in scope than section 235 as it can be used to obtain 
                                        
148  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 716. 
149  Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 62. 
150  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 712. 
151  Insolvency Act, 1986 s 235 (2). S 235 (3) notes that the persons referred to are those who are 
or have at any time been officers of the company, those who have taken part in the formation of 
the company at any time within one year before the date on which the company entered 
administration, those who are in the employment of the company (or another company), or have 
been in its employment (including employment under a contract for services) within that year, 
and are in the office holder's opinion capable of giving information which he requires and in the 
case of a company being wound up by the court, any person who has acted as the 
administrator, administrative receiver or liquidator of the company. 
152  Robinson Date Unknown http://www.practicallaw.com/5-521-0528. 
153  Re RGB Resources plc 2002 EWHC 1612 (Ch). 
154  Re RGB Resources plc 2002 EWHC 1612 (Ch). See also Official Receiver (Appellant) v Wadge 
Rapps and Hunt (a Firm) and Two Other Actions 2003 UKHL 49 paras 36- 38. 
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documents and information from persons outside the company, such as bank 
officials. Office holders are encouraged to make use of section 235. For example, in 
the Re Embassy Art Products Ltd155 matter it was held oppressive to seek the 
production of documents in wide terms without having made any attempt to obtain 
the information by letter or by any other means in the first place.156 
3.7  The Insolvency Service 
The insolvency practitioner does not act alone in the execution of his duties, but is 
regulated by The Insolvency Service, which is an executive agency within the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.157 The Insolvency Service's functions 
include the authorisation and regulation of the insolvency profession, dealing with 
the disqualification of unfit directors, and providing information to the public when 
necessary.158 There is also a Companies Investigations Branch which conducts 
confidential investigations into companies where it is in the public interest to do so.  
3.8 The Company Directors Disqualification Act 
Although no mention is made of the Directors Disqualification Act in section 236 of 
the Insolvency Act, 1986, these two measures should be read together.159 In the 
Pantmaenog160 matter the court pointed out that there is a close and important link 
between section 236(3) of the Insolvency Act, 1986 and section 7(3) of the 
Companies Directors Disqualification Act and referred to the matter of Re Polly Peck 
International plc,161 where it was stated that the purposes of the liquidation, 
administration or receivership, as the case may be, must include the gathering of 
information as to the conduct of the affairs of the company and those responsible 
for it in order that the office-holder can report to the Secretary of State as he is 
                                        
155  Re Embassy Art Products Ltd 1987 3 BCC 292. 
156  Re Embassy Art Products Ltd 1987 3 BCC 299. 
157  The Insolvency Service, an executive agency of the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, mainly acts as the interface between government and the various stakeholders in 
insolvency law, and although the decisive responsibility rests with the Secretary of State for the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the routine responsibility for the supervision and 
control of the insolvency system is delegated to the Insolvency Service. 
158  Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 27. 
159  Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd  49. 
160  Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd  49. 
161  Re Polly Peck International plc 1994 BCC 15, 16 A-B. 
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required to do by section 7(3) of the Companies Directors Disqualification Act.162 The 
court concludes that these provisions are complementary to each other. Information 
obtained under section 236 may be of use for more than one purpose and the 
section should therefore not be interpreted narrowly. 
3.9  Protection of the public interest and balancing interests 
The case of Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd163 introduces a further issue relevant to 
section 236, namely the public interest aspect of insolvencies. The court emphasized 
that the liquidator serves a public interest and not merely the financial interest of the 
creditors and contributories. The court referred to the report of the Cork 
Committee,164 which observed that "The law of insolvency takes the form of a 
compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, his creditors and society".165 As 
a result, the court pointed out, insolvency proceedings are not treated in English law 
as an exclusively private matter between the debtor and his creditor, as the interest 
of the community must be taken into account.166  
Keay defines public interest as those interests which society has a regard for and 
which are wider than the interests of those parties directly involved in an insolvent 
matter.167 He submits, however, that it is difficult to define the concept of the public 
interest and that there is no general consensus as to what the public interest 
involves. He concludes that it should not be assumed that the interests of the debtor 
and the creditors take preference over the public interest, nor should one say that 
the public interest is paramount. The correct approach is to consider all interests in 
each case, and to engage in a careful balancing exercise to determine which 
interests, based on the facts, should be preferred.168 Keay highlights the basic issues 
relating to interaction between the public interest and insolvency law and states the 
following: 
                                        
162  Fletcher The Law of Insolvency 716. 
163  Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd. 
164  Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (1982) - the "Cork Report". 
165  Review Committee para 192. 
166  Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd para 52. 
167  Keay 2000 NILQ 509.  
168  Keay 2000 NILQ 580. 
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It is possible to divide instances where the public interest is a factor in insolvency 
law into three very broad categories. First, it is in the public interest that 
insolvencies are resolved in an orderly and expeditious way. Second, it is in the 
public interest to ensure that commercial morality is enforced, so as, inter alia, to 
prevent fraud and improper practices.169 
This balance of interests is necessary to counter the wide discretion of the court in 
matters arising from section 236.170 It has been held that the court must be astute to 
prevent any oppressive, vexatious or unfair use of the section.171 The court must 
balance the needs of the liquidators with the potential oppression to the individuals. 
In Re Castle New Homes Ltd172 the court put it thus: 
The court will always be concerned to avoid vexation, oppression or injustice in 
making an order under section 236. If the evidence shows that the purpose of a 
litigator in seeking the examination is to achieve an advantage beyond that 
available to the ordinary litigant, in litigation which he has already commenced or 
which he has definitely decided to commence, the predisposition of the court may 
well be to refuse an immediate order for examination, unless the liquidator can 
show special grounds to the contrary. If, however, it appears from the evidence 
that the object of the liquidator is simply to elicit information that will enable or 
assist him to decide whether or not his company has a valid claim against a third 
party, the court will approach the liquidator's application with no such 
predisposition. While it will still be anxious in such a case to avoid oppression, it will 
also bear in mind that one of the very purposes of section [236] is to enable the 
liquidator 'as effectively as possible and…with as little expense as possible and with 
as much expedition as possible… to complete his function as liquidator…; and that 
to assist him in this may inevitably involve giving him a degree of advantage which 
would not be available to an ordinary potential litigant.173  
The above passage was quoted with approval in the matter of Cloverbay. 174 The 
court in Re British and Commonwealth Holdings also listed certain factors to be 
borne in mind when exercising the discretion.175 However, the court expressly 
excluded the factor that the purpose of section 236 was for the office holder to get 
sufficient knowledge and information to reconstitute the state of knowledge that the 
company should possess. The court was of the opinion that no limitation to the 
reconstitution of the company's state of knowledge exists, as was envisaged in 
                                        
169  Keay 2000 NILQ 509. See also Keay 2001 Anglo-American LR 209. 
170  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 709. 
171  In re Rolls Razor Ltd 700. 
172  Re Castle New Homes Ltd 1979 1 WLR 1075. 
173  Re Castle New Homes Ltd 1979 1 WLR 1090. 
174  Cloverbay 102. 
175  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 710. 
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Cloverbay.176 In Cowlishaw v O & D Building Contractors Ltd the court's discretion 
under section 236 was restrained, as the unfairness to the respondent in producing 
the documents outweighed the benefit to the liquidator of obtaining the 
documents.177  
3.10  Conclusion 
It is evident that insolvencies in England are strictly regulated. The Insolvency 
Service, a governmental agency created by statute, oversees the process. Although 
rooted in statute, the process is scaffolded by recognized professional bodies, rules, 
regulations, codes of ethics, statements of insolvency practice and insolvency 
guidance papers. The Insolvency Act, 1986 and the Disqualification Act are intended 
to work together and this shows that the focus of insolvencies in English law is wider 
than the determination of assets. The liquidator serves a public interest and does not 
represent only the creditors and contributories. Public interest is a nebulous concept 
which is better left undefined. The directors are under a statutory duty to assist the 
process by providing such information as the office holder may require. The private 
examination procedure is seen as a procedure of last resort and the office holder is 
expected to attempt to obtain information by any other means in the first instance. 
The court prevents oppressive, vexatious and unfair use of the section by balancing 
the needs of the office holder against the rights of the respondent.  
  
                                        
176  Fletcher Law of Insolvency 711. 
177  Cowlishaw v O & D Building Contractors Ltd 2009 EWHC 2445 (Ch). In this matter the 
respondents were concerned that the administrator's true purpose was to obtain the documents 
so that they could be sold to a buyer as a part of a package to sell the development. It was 
submitted on their behalf that it was an abuse of the procedure under s 236 to seek from them 
the "fruits of their labours". The court found this to be a valid objection. 
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4 Summary and recommendations 
4.1 Comparison between the South African and the English procedures 
The scope of application of a private examination is very wide.178 In both South 
Africa and England the procedure is unavailable in voluntary insolvency. In England 
the procedure is available in all other forms of insolvency, whereas the South African 
section refers to cases where a company is unable to pay its debts. This restriction is 
being eroded by our courts and has been made applicable to a company which was 
wound up on the basis that it was just and equitable to do so.179 The interpretation 
of the court in doing so is commended and it is submitted that future legislation 
should do away with the requirement of a company's being "unable to pay its 
debts". As stated by the court in Huang, liquidators in all cases of winding-up face 
similar problems, and there appears to be no rational basis to make a procedure 
available to only certain types of winding-up. This interpretation is not an extension 
of the section beyond its original intention and as such should be countenanced. 
The Master or the Court can instigate the procedure in South Africa on the 
assumption that there are instances where a secret examination without recourse to 
the court would benefit the winding-up process.180 In terms of English law, the 
procedure can be instigated only by the court, and the office holder applies to the 
court to commence a private enquiry. In the interests of certainty, some thought 
needs to be given to the personae that are empowered to instigate a private 
examination in South African law. This matter is addressed below under the heading 
of "Reform". It is submitted that the private examination, premised as it is on 
discretion and balance, is one that is best confined to the court's examination. 
Both the English and the South African systems view the private examination as an 
extraordinary procedure of a sui generis nature, where the examination is 
                                        
178  See Botha v Strydom 1992 2 SA 155 (N) 159G-I; Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue, Port Elizabeth 
1995 2 SA 433 (SE) A-B. 
179  Also see O'Brien 2002 TSAR 736, where it is envisaged that the restriction of s 236 to instances 
where company is "unable to pay its debts" should be revisited. 
180  Section 417 of the Companies Act notes that the Master or the court may summon a person for 
an examination. 
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inquisitorial and the ordinary standards of trial procedure are not applicable. Both 
systems make use of discretion in order to balance the rights of examinees against 
the need for information.  
In South African law the private examination is part of the administration process. In 
English law it is held to be oppressive to proceed with a statutory examination if 
information or documentation has not been requested informally by letter or other 
means. English law therefore envisages that a statutory examination be seen as a 
last resort. Furthermore, although the procedure under section 236 is sometimes 
referred to as a "private examination" the court may make a range of other orders, 
including the production of witness statements or documents. It is submitted that 
the insolvency process in South Africa will be enhanced by an adoption of the 
English approach. This is discussed more fully under "Reform" below. 
The general duties of the liquidator in South African law and an office holder under 
English law coincide in that both of them have the duty of recovering the assets of 
the company, paying the creditors, and distributing the surplus (if any) to the 
persons entitled to it. In English law the duties of an office holder are wider, 
including the duty to investigate the causes of a company's failure, to expose 
offences and to report on the grounds for recommending the disqualification of a 
director. This is an area where South African law is deficient, as discussed more fully 
below. 
The liquidator is probably not an officer of the court in South African law, but what is 
more important is that the liquidator is seen to be independent and impartial in his 
dealings.181 It is submitted that a statutory obligation on the liquidator to act in a 
fiduciary capacity towards the body of creditors as a whole will give clarity and 
credence to his position. This matter is therefore discussed under "Reform" below. 
The insolvency practitioner is an officer of the court in the England, but there no 
evident benefit in following this practice in South African law.  
                                        
181  See para 2.5 above. 
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Sanctions against the liquidator include an order by the Court for the liquidator to 
comply with a reasonable demand by the Master. The liquidator may also be 
removed by the Master and by the court, or by a majority of creditors, if he has not 
performed his duties satisfactorily. No action for damages can be brought against a 
liquidator for failing to do his duties. In English law, insolvency practitioners belong 
to one of the regulated bodies and these bodies may issue disciplinary orders 
against their members. These bodies can also withdraw a practitioner's insolvency 
licence on the basis that the practitioner is no longer a fit and proper person to 
perform the functions of a liquidator. 
4.2  Recommendations  
From the above discussion it can be seen that certain aspects pertaining to private 
examinations are ideal and should not be altered, such as the wide discretion of the 
court and the balance to be achieved between the rights of examinees and the 
needs of liquidators. Others are adequate, such as the provision for legal 
representation and access to information. Suggestions for reform are related to the 
following aspects of the private examination: who may instigate a private 
examination, using a public examination as a last resort, putting supportive 
measures and structures into place in order to scaffold the statutory foundation, 
encoding the fiduciary duties of liquidators, and extending the focus of a private 
examination. 
4.2.1 Who may instigate a private examination? 
In South Africa a private examination may be commenced by the Master or the 
Court. The Master's office is overburdened with duties. With particular reference to 
private examinations, the delegation of functions to a commissioner recognizes that 
the Master and the court are in need of assistance. It is submitted that delegation to 
a commissioner is treating the symptoms rather than eradicating the root of the 
problem. Instead of extending the power to instigate a private examination to the 
Master, and then attempting to ease his burden by making provision for delegation, 
it is submitted that a more realistic solution would be to limit the involvement of the 
Master altogether. In order to expand on this point of view, it is necessary to briefly 
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consider reform to insolvency law in general, with reference to recent corporate 
reform in South Africa. 
As already stated, insolvency law in South Africa has long been waiting its turn for 
reformative legislation. Recent years have seen the creation of a new corporate 
dispensation with the coming into being of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
which also introduced a new business rescue regime. With the development of 
company law, policy considerations have come into play, such as providing a "clear, 
facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced law" and "a protective and fertile 
environment for economic activity".182 Five points of economic growth were 
identified, namely enterprise development, promoting investment, making 
companies more efficient, encouraging transparency and high standards of 
governance, and following best practice jurisdictions internationally.183 Goal 
statements in reviewing corporate law included simplification, flexibility, efficiency, 
transparency and predictability. It is submitted that the same policy considerations 
and goals are applicable to corporate insolvency law and should similarly be 
adopted. 
In accordance with the policy of emulating best practice jurisdictions, one may look 
to English insolvency law, which has close links with South African insolvency law 
and which has seen extensive reform, for guidance. In England insolvency is 
regulated by an organ of state, namely the Insolvency Service. It is submitted that 
the appointment of an independent body to regulate insolvency law is required in 
South Africa as well required.184 A local example of such a regulatory body is the 
National Credit Regulator,185 which is responsible for the regulation of the South 
African credit industry. The National Credit Regulator has the task of education, 
research, policy development, the registration of industry participants, the 
investigation of complaints, and ensuring the enforcement of the National Credit 
Act.186 The establishment of a statutory regulatory body tasked with the supervision 
                                        
182  Memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 para 1. 
183  Memorandum on the objects of the Companies Bill, 2008 para 1. 
184  See Calitz Reformatory Approach ch 7. 
185  Established by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005.  
186  www.ncr.org.za. 
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of the insolvency industry, with the duties of education, research, policy 
development, the registration of insolvency practitioners, investigation and 
enforcement would result in increased clarity, predictability, and confidence in the 
system. With particular reference to private examinations, the insolvency 
practitioner, an appropriately qualified individual, should in applicable instances be 
empowered to apply to court to instigate a private examination. It is important, 
though, that this should occur only at the point where all else has failed.  
4.2.2  The public examination as a last resort 
The English interpretation of the private examination as an expedient to be adopted 
as a last resort is commendable, and South African law may benefit from 
incorporating a similar approach. Emphasis should be placed on the informal 
examination of persons who may assist in the liquidation process and the statutory 
duties of directors to assist in the liquidation process should be underscored. A 
leaning towards this approach is found in the Johannesburg bar practice manual, 
which notes that when an application is made to examine a particular witness, it 
must be shown that the witness in question has refused to furnish the information 
required of him or is otherwise unwilling to cooperate with the liquidator.187  
4.2.3  Supportive measures 
Sufficient supportive measures should be included in the new insolvency regime to 
bolster the insolvency practitioner in his duties. This is another instance where 
English law may assist reform in the South African context. Augmenting strategies 
employed by the English system include complementary legislation such as the 
Director's Disqualification Act, 1986, which has its own body of investigation and 
enforcement. The procedure in terms of English law appears to be more a more 
effective way of policing the behaviour of directors. In English law, further, the 
Insolvency Service appoints official receivers to investigate the affairs of companies 
in compulsory liquidation to establish the reasons for the insolvency and report on 
                                        
187  Johannesburg Bar practice manual of the South Gauteng High Court 10.8. 
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misconduct.188 Furthermore, for grave offences there is the Serious Fraud Office, that 
investigates and prosecutes serious or complex fraud or corruption. 
4.2.4  Statutory statement of the fiduciary duties of a liquidator 
Our courts have highlighted the need for a liquidator to be independent and 
impartial and to act in a fiduciary capacity towards creditors and the company.189 
Again, it is useful to have regard to the recent innovations in company law in this 
regard. One of the novel aspects introduced by the act is the fact that it includes a 
statutory statement of the fiduciary duties of directors. The act includes "standards 
of directors' conduct"190 in terms of which a director must exercise his powers and 
functions in good faith and for a proper purpose,191 in the bests interests of the 
company,192 and with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be 
expected of him.193 If a director breaches his fiduciary duties, he can be held liable in 
accordance with the principles of the common law194 or in terms of delict for any 
loss, damages or costs as a consequence of a breach of care, skill and diligence. 
These duties are mandatory, prescriptive and unalterable. They apply to all 
companies, and directors cannot contract out of these duties.195 Cassim notes that 
their object is to raise the standards of corporate and directorial behaviour.196  
It is submitted that a similar approach may be adopted in order to regulate the 
duties of a liquidator, namely a statutory statement of duties that will make these 
duties more clear and accessible. A codification or statutory statement of duties 
                                        
188  The Insolvency Service also investigates persons in bankruptcy. 
189  See paras 2.4.-2.5 above. 
190  Companies Act, 2008 s 76. 
191  Companies Act, 2008 s 76(3)(a). 
192  Companies Act, 2008 s 76(3)(b). 
193  Companies Act, 2008 s 76(3)(c). 
194  Companies Act, 2008 s 77. 
195  Cassim Contemporary Company Law 507. 
196  The statutory fiduciary duties are extended to a business rescue practitioner in terms of the 
business rescue proceedings contained in Ch 6 of the new Companies Act, by virtue of the fact 
that a business rescue practitioner, during rescue proceedings, has the responsibilities, duties 
and liabilities of a director of the company, as set out in ss 75 to 77 of the Companies Act, 2008. 
In addition, the business rescue practitioner may be held liable in accordance with any relevant 
law for the consequences of any act or omission amounting to gross negligence in the exercise 
of the powers and performance of the functions of practitioner, although he is not liable for any 
act or omission made in good faith in the course of the exercise of his powers and the 
performance of his functions (s 140(3)(c)). 
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would likewise have the object of raising the standard of behaviour of insolvency 
practitioners and would provide a predictable and effective environment for the 
efficient discharge of a practitioner's duties. These duties should be mandatory and 
unalterable. In the English system there is a structure of interwoven rules, 
regulations, codes and guidelines which augment the statutory basis of the 
insolvency law. This system of certainty, transparency, accessibility and predictability 
is one that should be emulated in our law. 
4.2.5  Extending the focus of the liquidator's duties 
A significant difference in focus between the South African and English systems is 
the fact that the official receiver is tasked with the duty not only to determine and 
realize the assets of the insolvent company, but also to investigate and report on the 
cause of the failure of the company. In South Africa the overarching purpose of the 
section has consistently been interpreted by our courts as being for the acquisition 
of information. South African insolvency law would be enhanced if the focus of the 
examination were to be extended to include an investigation into the cause of the 
failure of the company. There is a greater awareness of the interdependence 
between companies and the society in which they function, and there should be an 
increased responsibility in the insolvency process on the reasons why companies 
have failed. 
4.3  Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is submitted that far from being draconian, it is vital that section 
417 be retained in a new insolvency regime. The accessibility of the section to 
liquidators, the inquisitorial nature of the proceedings, the wide scope of the section 
and the effective sanctions should examinees not comply together combine to make 
a formula that has over the years proved impervious to circumvention. The sheer 
regularity with which private examinations are sought to be challenged in our courts 
is indicative of the effectiveness of the section. It is hard not to draw the inference 
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that it is particularly those with something to hide that are mostly desirous to evade 
the examination. The court in Podlas197 put it thus:  
It is difficult to see why an insolvent who has made a clean breast and has nothing 
to hide should shirk an interrogation such as the one the applicant objects to... A 
person who is sequestrated effectively sacrifices his or her right to privacy in regard 
to, at the least, pre-sequestration patrimonial matters. The rights of a creditor 
enjoy preference over those of an insolvent...198  
It is submitted that this section must remain part of our future insolvency legislation 
as it fulfills its function with prudent efficiency. This submission is strengthened by 
the fact that the Constitutional Court, after careful consideration, has kept sections 
417 and 418 wholly intact,199 with the exception of those parts that infringed on the 
rule of self-incrimination. Recommendations have been made in this article on 
aspects where the section may be enhanced by reform. In part, these 
recommendations rely on the premise that South African insolvency law in toto is 
desperately in need of an overhaul. Meaningful reform will include a re-evaluation of 
the Master's role, widening the scope of the liquidator's duties, and making it 
obligatory for liquidators to act honestly and impartially. Such measures will bring 
certainty and credibility which will hopefully help to counterbalance the resistance to 
the "draconian" private enquiry. 
  
                                        
197  Podlas v Bryden 1994 4 SA 662 (T). 
198  Podlas v Bryden 1994 4 SA 662 (T), which dealt with a private examination in terms of s 152 of 
the Insolvency Act. 
199  See fn 113, 114. 
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